Deflationists about truth typically deny that truth is a causal-explanatory property. However, the now familiar 'success argument' attempts to show that truth plays an important causal-explanatory role in explanations of practical success. Deflationists have standardly responded that the truth predicate appears in such explanations merely as a logical device, and that therefore truth has not been shown to play a causal-explanatory role. I argue that if we accept Jackson and Pettit's account of causal explanations, the standard deflationist response is inconsistent, (...) for on this account even logical properties can be causally explanatory. Therefore the deflationist should remain neutral as to whether truth is a causal-explanatory property, and focus instead on the claim that truth, if it is a property, is a merely logical one. (shrink)

Revelation is the thesis that having an experience that instantiates some phenomenal property puts us in a position to know the nature or essence of that property. It is widely held that although Revelation is prima facie plausible, it is inconsistent with physicalism, and, in particular, with the claim that phenomenal properties are physical properties. I outline the standard argument for the incompatibility of Revelation and physicalism and compare it with the Knowledge Argument. By doing so, I hope to show (...) that on various plausible interpretations of Revelation it is in fact consistent with physicalism. Moreover, there is a robust reading of Revelation that a posteriori physicalists can, and should, accept. (shrink)

In a famous footnote in Naming and Necessity, Kripke offered “something like a proof” of the thesis that material things have their material origins essentially (EMO). Although the sketch of a proof Kripke gave was incomplete in important respects, many philosophers have since endeavoured to develop Kripke’s style of argument so that it reaches its intended conclusion.1 In particular, a number of philosophers have attempted to complete Kripke’s argument sketch by appealing to some sort of “sufficiency principle” – a principle (...) that gives sufficient conditions for the identity of objects across possible worlds. These developments of Kripke’s argument face a number of problems, as pointed out by Mackie (1987, 2002), Robertson (1998, 2000) and others.2 Recently, however, Rohrbaugh and deRosset (2004, 2006) have offered a new route to origin essentialism that develops a Kripke-style argument without appeal to a sufficiency principle. While this argument has also not escaped criticism3, the argument suffers from a crucial flaw which has not been noticed. More interesting, though, is that the problem the argument faces is the same problem facing the arguments that appeal to sufficiency principles, and indeed Kripke’s original “proof” – all these arguments over-generalize. This strongly suggests that there is no Kripkestyle route to origin essentialism. (shrink)

Book Information The Compositionality Papers. The Compositionality Papers Jerry A. Fodor and Ernest Lepore , Oxford: Clarendon Press , 2002 , viii + 212 , US$65.00 ( cloth ), US$19.95 ( paper ) By Jerry A. Fodor. and Ernest Lepore. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. viii + 212. US$65.00 (cloth:), US$19.95 (paper:).

When Donald Davidson published his influential article ‘Actions, Reasons and Causes’ [1963], many of his contemporaries were convinced that reasons for action could not be causes of anything, so that even an explanation such as ‘Gilbert knelt because he had decided to propose to Gertrude’ did not work by citing Gilbert’s decision as a cause of his kneeling. Davidson was mainly responsible for demolishing that consensus and reinstating causalism—the thesis that psychological or rationalizing explanations of human behaviour are a species (...) of event-causal explanation—as the dominant view in the philosophy of action, so that it is now often regarded as an obvious truth. (shrink)

‘The Unity of the Proposition’ is a label for a problem which has intermittently intrigued philosophers but which for much of the last century lay neglected in the sad, lightless room under the stairs of philosophical progress, along with other casualties and bugaboos of early analytic philosophy such as the doctrine of internal relations, the identity theory of truth, and Harold Joachim. Yet it was while struggling with this problem (among others), that Bertrand Russell built one of the first steps (...) on the staircase by creating what came later to be called the theory of descriptions.1 According to that theory, statements containing definite descriptions are true only if there exists a unique thing satisfying the description. So nothing one says about ‘The Problem of the Unity of the Proposition’, for example, can be true unless there is one and only one such problem. Yet, as we shall explain below (§1), on the one hand it is unclear that there is any such problem at all, while, on the other, if there is a problem, there seem to be several. One might conclude, then, that everything we say in this paper is likely to be false. But perhaps the paper could be, in the context, appropriately treated as a ladder, to be kicked away after climbing. For Wittgenstein, too, was concerned with the problem: ‘At the centre of Wittgenstein’s project was the task of explaining the unity of the proposition’, says Michael Potter, for example.2 Wittgenstein had inherited the task from two of his philosophical mentors, Russell and Frege. Yet while Russell’s series of failed accounts of propositions, and then judgments, each of which was meant to resolve the problem, seemed ultimately to serve only as a sort of negative inspiration for him,3 Frege’s response to the problem proved a deep influence. We will outline Frege’s position as a backdrop to Wittgenstein’s below (§§2 and 3). As we will argue, one of the most important ways in which Wittgenstein’s position resembles Frege’s is precisely that his (Wittgenstein’s) solution to the problem of unity required treating his own book as an attempt to say the unsayable.. (shrink)

In the last 30 years repeated attempts have been made to develop a proof-sketch Kripke gave for essentialism about material origins into a cogent argument. I argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed, and so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail.

The most important contemporary debate in the theory of truth is that between inflationists and deflationists.1 But although the debate is of fundamental importance, we do not have a clear, unproblematic formulation of the difference between the two camps. Part of the reason for this is that contemporary deflationists have given up many of the distinctive positions that their predecessors endorsed: typically, they no longer claim that the truth predicate is redundant, that there is no property of truth, or that (...) ‘true’ is not a predicate.2 While the desire to eschew these claims is understandable, doing so has made it more difficult to identify any difference between deflationists and inflationists, and the debate, particularly between deflationists and correspondence theorists, sometimes appears to evaporate. Perhaps in response to this worry, contemporary deflationists have adopted a range of new and distinctive deflationary claims about truth. Yet, as a number of critics have pointed out, many of these new positions are equally as implausible as those of earlier deflationists. (shrink)

For many, the paradigm of a deflationary theory of truth is the redundancy theory, which is typically taken to consist of two claims: namely (i) that sentences containing the truth predicate are synonymous with sentences not containing the truth predicate (and so the truth predicate is redundant) and (ii) that there is no property of truth.1 The redundancy theory is not an attractive theory of truth since neither of its claims is particularly plausible on its own, and the combination of (...) the two claims is, if not actually inconsistent, at least uncomfortable.2 Very few deflationists nowadays endorse either part of the theory. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 735-738, December 2011.

Although its use is not universal, there is a map of the logical space of theories of truth that is widely applied. According to this map, the most foundational divide amongst theories of truth is that between deflationary and inflationary theories, where, roughly, the former hold that truth is an insubstantial, logical property of little philosophical interest and the latter that it is a substantial property suitable for philosophical attention. Amongst the inflationary theories, there are other fundamental divisions. For example, (...) on the one hand, correspondence theorists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of the proposition’s standing in a relation to something else which is not a proposition, such as a fact. On the other hand, coherence theorists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of its relations to other propositions. And again, pragmatists hold that the truth of a proposition is a matter of its being useful to believe. Throughout the twentieth century, philosophers used one or other version of this map to orient themselves and their students in the often complex and confusing debates about truth, even while acknowledging that the map may be incomplete in crucial respects (it does not include functionalist and pluralist views, for example). Our objection to the map is not that it is incomplete—although it obviously is—, but that it needs to be radically redrawn. In particular, the familiar division between coherence theories and correspondence theories needs to be rethought. The coherence theory is so often glibly dismissed as absurd that labelling someone as a coherence theorist is often seen as reason enough to ignore them.1 While none of the philosophers usually so labelled should be ignored, we shall argue (§3) that none of them actually held this view anyway. The difficulty—perhaps impossibility—of finding a genuine coherence theorist of truth strikes us as more than just an indication that this is a rare animal. Rather, it suggests the possibility of something significant, namely, that the only occupant of this position in historical space is a set of slogans; this would give us some reason to suppose that the logical space of theories is just as empty at this point.. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 199-202, March 2012.

In several publications Graeme Forbes has developed and defended one of the strongest arguments for essentialism about biological origins. I attempt to show that there are deep, as yet unrecognized, problems with this argument. The problems with Forbes’s argument suggest that a range of other arguments for various forms of origin essentialism are also likely to be flawed, and that we should abandon the seemingly plausible general metaphysical thesis that concrete entities that share all intrinsic properties are identical.

There is a significant lack of diversity in philosophy, including an underrepresentation of women and people of color, and a dearth of philosophy programs that offer classes exploring philosophy outside the Western canon. This problem is further compounded by institutional racism, sexism, and ableism within philosophy pedagogy and practice and the perception that philosophy is an abstract subject suitable only for academically advanced students. If philosophy were made more accessible to a diverse group of students before they entered college, would (...) it be possible to recruit more individuals from underrepresented groups into the field? In 2018, PLATO and the APA surveyed their members about their first exposure to philosophy. It was clear that early experiences—conversations with friends and family, books in grade school, and classes in high school—were pivotal moments that generated interest in philosophy. In this paper we describe some of these experiences and suggest that P4C programs, if done well, have the potential to help build a robust and inclusive K–12 to college philosophy pipeline by tapping into the natural interest children have in philosophical wondering. (shrink)

The thesis critically examines the question of the philosophical coherence of finitism, the view which seeks to interpret mathematics without postulating an actual infinity of mathematical objects. It is argued that a widely accepted characterization of finitism, most recently expounded by Tait, is inadequate, and a new characterization based on the notion of elementary abstraction is proposed. It is further argued that the notion of elementary abstraction better explains the bearing of Godel's incompleteness theorems on the issue of the coherence (...) of finitism. By abstraction is meant a procedure by which one recognizes or establishes that some infinite process exhibits a distinctive uniformity. If the procedure does not require one to conceive of the integers in any other way than as the result of simple iterations, we call such abstraction elementary. Some six different formal models exploring a variety of different ways in which this notion can be made precise are proposed as possible formal characterizations of finitistic truth. It is proved that all these different models are equivalent with respect to finitistically meaningful sentences. This is taken as strong evidence that the notion of elementary abstraction is determinate enough to provide a basis for a coherent philosophical formulation of finitism. (shrink)

We study a hierarchy of Kalmàr elementary functions on integers based on a classification of LOOP programs of limited complexity, namely those in which the depth of nestings of LOOP commands does not exceed two. It is proved that -place functions in can be enumerated by a single function in , and that the resulting hierarchy of elementary predicates (i.e., functions with 0,1-values) is proper in that there are predicates that are not in . Along the way the rudimentary predicates (...) of Smullyan are classified as. (shrink)

Is it time for politics and political theory to face the challenge of artificial intelligence (AI)? It seems to be the case that political theory constantly lags behind technological developments. With rapid developments in the field of AI, a common estimate is that technological singularity will probably happen in the next 50 to 200 years. Even regardless of the time frame, the very possibility of superhumanly smart AIs poses serious political questions and calls for some serious political decisions. Luckily, some (...) scenarios are already provided by science fiction. The most common trope is that of a hostile AI taking over and destroying/enslaving humanity. Yet there is another path—AI takes over and makes itself a ruler (openly or behind the scenes), but rules in the genuine best interest of humanity. Such a turn of events, as described in Neal Asher’s Polity novels, may be an improvement compared to present political arrangements. It will, however, probably rob us of politics as such. (shrink)

It is well known that the following features hold of AR + T under the strong Kleene scheme, regardless of the way the language is Gödel numbered: 1. There exist sentences that are neither paradoxical nor grounded. 2. There are 2ℵ0 fixed points. 3. In the minimal fixed point the weakly definable sets (i.e., sets definable as {n∣ A(n) is true in the minimal fixed point where A(x) is a formula of AR + T) are precisely the Π1 1 sets. (...) 4. In the minimal fixed point the totally defined sets (sets weakly defined by formulae all of whose instances are true or false) are precisely the ▵1 1 sets. 5. The closure ordinal for Kripke's construction of the minimal fixed point is ωCK 1. In contrast, we show that under the weak Kleene scheme, depending on the way the Gödel numbering is chosen: 1. There may or may not exist nonparadoxical, ungrounded sentences. 2. The number of fixed points may be any positive finite number, ℵ0, or 2ℵ0 . 3. In the minimal fixed point, the sets that are weakly definable may range from a subclass of the sets 1-1 reducible to the truth set of AR to the Π1 1 sets, including intermediate cases. 4. Similarly, the totally definable sets in the minimal fixed point range from precisely the arithmetical sets up to precisely the ▵1 1 sets. 5. The closure ordinal for the construction of the minimal fixed point may be ω, ωCK 1, or any successor limit ordinal in between. In addition we suggest how one may supplement AR + T with a function symbol interpreted by a certain primitive recursive function so that, irrespective of the choice of the Godel numbering, the resulting language based on the weak Kleene scheme has the five features noted above for the strong Kleene language. (shrink)

Setting Out on the Great Way: Essays on Early Mahayana Buddhism, edited by Paul Harrison. Equinox Publications, 2018. 320pp. Hb. £75.00, Pb/eBook. £26.99. ISBN-13: Hb. 9781781790960, Pb. 9781781798539, eBook 9781781796856.

Kristiansen and Murwanashyaka recently proved that Robinson arithmetic, Q, is interpretable in an elementary theory of full binary trees, T. We prove that, conversely, T is interpretable in Q by producing a formal interpretation of T in an elementary concatenation theory QT+, thereby also establishing mutual interpretability of T with several well-known weak essentially undecidable theories of numbers, strings, and sets. We also introduce a “hybrid” elementary theory of strings and trees, WQT*, and establish its mutual interpretability with Robinson’s weak (...) arithmetic R, the weak theory of trees WT of Kristiansen and Murwanashyaka, and the weak concatenation theory WTCε of Higuchi and Horihata. (shrink)

Modern physics encompasses theoretical and experimental research divided in subfields with specific features. For instance, high energy physics (HEP) attracts significant funding and has distinct organizational structures, i.e., large laboratories and cross-institutional collaborations. Expensive equipment and large experiments create a specific work atmosphere and human relations. While the gender misbalance is characteristic for STEM, early-career researchers are inherently dependent on their supervisors. This raises the question of how satisfied researchers with working in physics are and how different subgroups – female (...) and early-career researchers – perceive their work environment. We empirically investigated job satisfaction and satisfaction with the academic system among physicists (N=123) working in large laboratories, universities, and independent institutes. The scale for measuring the satisfaction with the academic system in physics yielded three factors: experience of research autonomy, opportunities to use one's knowledge, and appreciation of the research by the general public. The results show that physicists are less satisfied with the academic system than with their work environment. Moreover, female scientists and junior researchers experience their jobs more negatively. The results emphasize the need for improving work and research conditions for underprivileged groups in physics. Interestingly, no significant effect was found between different types of academic institutions and general job satisfaction. Finally, physicists felt that their work has not been well understood by the public. (shrink)

Individuals who experience stereotype threat – the pressure resulting from social comparisons that are perceived as unfavourable – show performance decrements across a wide range of tasks. One account of this effect is that the cognitive pressure triggered by such threat drains the same cognitive resources that are implicated in the respective task. The present study investigates whether mindfulness can be used to moderate stereotype threat, as mindfulness has previously been shown to alleviate working-memory load. Our results show that performance (...) decrements that typically occur under stereotype threat can indeed be reversed when the individual engages in a brief mindfulness task. The theoretical implications of our findings are discussed. (shrink)

By critically exploring interdisciplinary perspectives on empathy, this dialogical volume _Exploring Empathy_ aims to generate deeper thinking about what is at stake in discussions and practices of empathy in the 21st century.

The rich and diverse contributions to this volume span a wide variety of disciplines, from psychology and philosophy to neuroscience, by some of the most influential scholars in the emerging science of personal wisdom. As such, it is a collection of essential readings and the first publication to integrate both the spiritual and pragmatic dimensions of personal wisdom. The content of the book goes beyond speculative theory to present a wealth of scientific research currently under way in this expanding field. (...) It also describes numerous promising methods now being deployed in the quest for scientific knowledge of the elusive, yet critical, phenomenon of personal wisdom. The book is an excellent introduction to the field for novice researchers as well as a stimulating and enlightening resource for established experts. Its broad appeal makes it a vital addition to the libraries of academics and practitioners in many disciplines, from developmental psychology to gerontology, and from philosophy to contemplative religious traditions such as Buddhism. (shrink)

Ensuring that countries have adequate research capacities is essential for an effective and efficient response to infectious disease outbreaks. The need for ethical principles and values embodied in international research ethics guidelines to be upheld during public health emergencies is widely recognized. Public health officials, researchers and other concerned stakeholders also have to carefully balance time and resources allocated to immediate treatment and control activities, with an approach that integrates research as part of the outbreak response. Under such circumstances, research (...) “ethics preparedness” constitutes an important foundation for an effective response to infectious disease outbreaks and other health emergencies. A two-day workshop was convened in March 2018 by the World Health Organisation Global Health Ethics Team and the African coaLition for Epidemic Research, Response and Training, with representatives of National Ethics Committees, to identify practical processes and procedures related to ethics review preparedness. The workshop considered five areas where work might be undertaken to facilitate rapid and sound ethics review: preparing national ethics committees for outbreak response; pre-review of protocols; multi-country review; coordination between national ethics committees and other key stakeholders; data and benefit sharing; and export of samples to third countries. In this paper, we present the recommendations that resulted from the workshop. In particular, the participants recommended that Ethics Committees would develop a formal national standard operating procedure for emergency response ethical review; that there is a need to clarify the terminology and expectations of pre-review of generic protocols and agree upon specific terminology; that there is a need to explore mechanisms for multi-country emergency ethical consultation, and to establish procedures for communication between national ethics committees and other oversight bodies and public health authorities. In addition, it was suggested that ethics committees should request from researchers, at a minimum, a preliminary data sharing and sample sharing plan that outlines the benefit to the population from which data and samples are to be drawn. This should be followed in due time by a full plan. It is hoped that the national ethics committees, supported by the WHO, relevant collaborative research consortia and external funding agencies, will work towards bringing these recommendations into practice, for supporting the conduct of effective research during outbreaks. (shrink)

Where the Two Seas Meet: The Qurʾānic Story of al-Khiḍr and Moses in Sufi Commentaries as a Model of Spiritual Guidance. By Hugh Talat Halman. Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2013. Pp. xxi + 319. $29.95.

Philosophical Perspectives on Modern Qurʾānic Exegesis: Key Paradigms and Concepts. By Massimo Campanini. Themes in Qurʾānic Studies Series. Sheffield and Bristol: Equinox, 2016. Pp. x + 154. $29.95, £19.99.

This essay discusses the work of two female theatre-makers, and their strategic use of nudity on stage. The author appropriates signs of indignation in this work in order to re-visit the ‘problem’ of the female form being traditionally associated with bodily immanence rather than transcendence. Both Nic Green's Trilogy (2009–2010) and Ursula Martinez’ My Stories, Your Emails (2010) use the naked female form to proffer statements about the experience of being a woman in the 2000s. Their use of nudity breaks (...) with feminist theories popular in the 1990s, which argued that because the female form could never escape the symbolic logic of phallocentrism, it could never escape sexual objectification, and thus should operate on the margins of mainstream culture, cultivate agency by appropriating the means of production and be removed from view (radical negativity). By identifying as ‘artists’ and by insisting on their right to put their experience centre stage, Green and Martinez break with the anti-humanist theories of the 1990s and proffer a more individualistic strain of feminist performance. The author celebrates this work as a break away from the deadlock offered by theories of radical negativity. (shrink)

When viewed the history of Islamic thought, it is seen that the scholars have made an effort to understand the nature of the speech of God and make sense of it. Essentially, understanding and grasping of the words of God are an effort to look from the physical realm to the metaphysical one. In spite of this fact, the scholars as the indomitable seekers of truth are in search of finding some clues to say about it. While some of them (...) consider the “divine speech” as an attribute of God, many others view it as a divine act. It is also admitted by all of them that whether being attributive or act of God, the reflection of the divine speech is the Qur’ân. In this sense, three views have been put forward on the question of the belonging of the Qur’ânic words. According to the dominant and preferred point of view among these views, Qur’ân belongs to God in terms of wording and meaning. Accordingly, the revelation of the Qur’ân, which was revealed to the Prophet Mohammed consists of both wording and meaning. Therefore, there is no intervention or contribution of Gabriel or Muhammad in constituting of Qur’ân. According to the second approach, the meaning of Qur’ânic text belongs to God, however, its words pertain to Mohammed. This view signals that Gabriel revealed nothing more than the meanings of Qur’ân. Mohammed understands the meanings conveyed to him and then said them in Arabic expression patterns and phrases. According to the third approach, the meanings of Qur’ânic text belongs to God, however, its words pertain to Gabriel. In other words, only meanings of text were given to Gabriel, and its words are formed by him. In the present study, the mentioned approaches which are put forward by scholars about the belonging of Qur’ânic words will be examined in terms of the integrity of the Qur’ân and Tafsir rumors (riwâyât) of the classical period. In a nutshell, it can be said that there is no disagreement among scholars in the field of the belonging of the meanings of Qur’ânic text to God. The main disagreement is whether the Qur’ânic words belong to God, Gabriel or Muhammad. Considering the integrity of Qur’ân and Tafsir rumors regarding to the circumstances of sending down of the Qur’ânic revelation, it has been determined that the prevailing view is more consistent than the other two views. (shrink)

Scholars have studied the concept of holy war in the Bible for well over a century. Both traditional Muslim and modern Western scholars have likewise studied the qur'?nic view of war, but little has been done to examine scriptural justification for holy war as a cross-cultural phenomenon. A comparison of biblical with qur'?nic war texts reveals that, despite historical, cultural, and geographical differences, scriptural justification for mass slaughter in war first appears for the purpose of defense but steadily evolves into (...) divinely encouraged and even divinely commanded offensive war. The differences in the evolving concept between the two scriptures and their exegesis can be explained by the different histories of two religious civilizations. (shrink)

This study is an attempt toexamine the critiques of Mu‘tazilites in general and Rukn al-Dīn Abū Ṭāhir al- Ṭuraythīthī in particular, of “ta’yēen by naṣṣ”(appointment by text or direct proclamation) which has long been discussedwithin the intellectual history of Islam. The concept of ta’yēen by nass is a case which has been attemptedto be grounded on the basis of Qur’ān and Ḥadith. Although it is thought to bepeculiar to the Shiite circles, it has also been expressed in some Sunnischools as (...) well. Despite the fact that it is generally discussed in regard tothe imamate of the fourth Caliph ‘Ali,some also argued that ta‘yēen by ṇass was to be the case for the imamateof Abū Bakr. Concerning this theory, Mu‘tazilalevelled a great number of essential critiques at the Shiites’ understanding ofmatter. Since it has been discussed in direct relation to the textual evidencesfrom the Qur’ān, a re-examination of the subject in the Qur’anic context is required. In this regard, themethodological approach of Mu‘tazilitescholar al-Ṭuraythīthī is an important component to take into consideration.Ṭāhir al- Ṭuraythīthīcriticizes the sects for their understandings of the notion of ta‘yēen by naṣṣ, in his prominent book “Mutashābihal-Qur’ān” inwhich he tries to understand the subject at stake within the boundaries of languageand reason. Moreover, he evaluates the assertions of both Imāmiyya and Bakriyyaand criticizes both sides relying on the contextual basis of Qur’ānic verses. (shrink)

The paper aims to show how the Tv series True Detective (season 1, 2014 – created and written by Nic Pizzolatto) aids us understanding the status of power whether in its political, judicial or religious form. The conjunction of sex and death is depicted through acts of paedophilia, rape, and murder of women and children. The study aims to elucidate the logic which is inherent to those acts of violence and which founds the reproduction of social domination mechanisms.

The End of Materialism: How Evidence of the Paranormal Is Bringing Science and Spirit Together by Charles T. Tart. Philosophy of Personal Identity and Multiple Personality by Logi Gunnarsson. Eusapia Palladino and Her Phenomena by Hereward Carrington. Can the Mind Survive beyond Death? In Pursuit of Scientific Evidence by Satwant K. Pasricha. Morphic Resonance: The Nature of Formative Causation by Rupert Sheldrake. A New Science of Life: The Hypothesis of Formative Causation by Rupert Sheldrake. “Why AI Is a Dangerous Dream,” (...) Opinion, Interview with Noel Sharkey by Nic Fleming. (shrink)

The interpretation of Eth. Nic. C 1, and particularly of the notion of ``voluntariness'' and ``involuntariness'' is often distorted by the inappropriate overlap of questions deriving from modern moral philosophy. Firstly, this paper presents the scholarly debate on the topics frequently connected with the Aristotelian concepts of ἑκούσιον/ἀκούσιον (determinism/indeterminism, mixed acts and dirty hands theory, mixed acts vs. instrumental acts, role of circumstances, etc.). The next step is the analysis of the relevant passages of Eth. Nic. through a close examination (...) of the relationship between the notions of ``choice'' and ``voluntariness'': what is crucial for the voluntariness of an action is the individuation of the efficient cause. On this basis it is possible to clarify the role and the significance of mixed acts and of other kinds of actions described by Aristotle. Finally, the topics previously displayed are re-examined in order to shed some light on the distortions arising from the adoption of inadequate lens in interpreting ancient texts. (shrink)

Zdá se, že není nic přirozenějšího, než se spolu s Russellem domnívat, že „máme-li smysluplně hovořit a ne pouze vydávat zvuky, musíme slovům, která užíváme, dávat nějaký význam; a významem, který svým slovům dáváme, musí být něco, s čím jsme přišli do styku“. Naše slova přece musí, aby byla skutečně smysluplná, něco představovat! Od toho se odvíjí běžná poučka, která nám říká, že slova jazyka jsou symboly, to jest (podle Encyklopedie Britannica), „prvky komunikace, které mají představovat osobu, předmět, skupinu, proces (...) nebo ideu“. Problém je ovšem v tom, že není zdaleka zřejmé, co to vůbec znamená něco představovat; a co to tedy znamená být symbolem. V běžném jazyce hovoříme o představování například tehdy, když říkáme, že herec na jevišti divadla představuje dánského prince Hamleta, nebo že krabička sirek, kterou použijeme namísto ztracené šachové figurky, představuje černou věž. Jak vůbec může dojít k tomu, aby něco (nebo někdo) představovalo něco (nebo někoho) jiného? Jednou ze možností jistě je, že to někdo vyhlásí a jiní to přijmou. V programu divadla se například napíše, že se hraje Hamlet, diváci si to přečtou a vědí, že člověk, který pobíhá po jevišti s lebkou, představuje onoho dánského prince. Člověk, který zjistí, že mu chybí šachová figurka, vezme krabičku sirek a prohlásí „Tato krabička bude představovat černou věž“. To je čirá konvence: lidé se o tom, že něco bude představovat něco jiného, jednoduše dohodnou. K takové dohodě sice není potřeba, aby s ní ti, kdo ji přijímají, nahlas vyslovovali souhlas; je k ní nicméně potřeba, aby ji někdo vyhlásil a někdo jiný jeho vyhlášení porozuměl a přijal ho. Z toho ovšem plyne, že o takto konvenční druh představování se jazyk opírat nemůže; alespoň ne obecně. Brání tomu fakt, že k ustanovení takové konvence už jazyk potřebujeme – potřebujeme tedy již nějaká slova, která něco 'představují', mít. Když již nějaký jazyk máme, není problém zavést konvencí další jazyk – jak je to ale s tím prvním jazykem? (Nebylo by možné, abychom konvenci ustanovili za pomoci nějakých pouze 'předjazykových' komunikačních prostředků? Nemůžeme konvenci, na jejímž základě nějaký typ zvuku představuje velryby, ustanovit třebs pomocí pouhého ukazování na velryby? Problém je zřejmě v tom, že rámec, který by byl potřeba k tomu, aby mohlo být to či ono gesto interpretováno jako ukázání, které ustanovuje, co bude daný zvuk představovat, by musel sestávat z tak komplexních komunikčaních praktik, že je opět stěží představitelný jinak než v podobě jazyka.) Samozřejmě, že konvence není tou jedinou cestou, jak může dojít k tomu, že něco představuje něco jiného.. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus’ argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11).1 At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus’ argument. For some object (οἱ δ᾽ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (...) (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ γαθὸν οὗ πάντ᾽ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim. (shrink)

This article reports the findings from a study of discursive representations of the future role of technology in the work of the US National Intelligence Council. Specifically, it investigates the interplay of ‘techno-optimism’ and propositional certainty in the NIC’s ‘Future Global Trends Reports’. In doing so, it answers the following questions: To what extent was techno-optimism present in the discourse? What level of propositional certainty was expressed in the discourse? How did the discourse deal with the inherent uncertainty of the (...) future? Overall, the discourse was pronouncedly techno-optimist in its stance towards the future role of technology: high-technological solutions were portrayed as solving a host of problems, despite the readily available presence of low-technology or no-technology solutions. In all, 75.1% of the representations were presented as future categorical certainties, meaning the future was predominantly presented as a known and closed inevitability. The discourse dealt with the inherent uncertainty of the subject matter, that is, the future, by projecting the past and present into the future. This was particularly the case in relation to the idea of technological military dominance as a guarantee of global peace, and the role of technology as an inevitable force free from societal censorship. (shrink)

Aristotle's Ethica Eudemia and Ethica Nicomachea, as is well known and much discussed, contain three books in common. Less well known, at least until Dieter Harlfinger alerted scholars to the fact in 1971, is that some of the manuscripts of Eth. Eud. do, contrary to the then prevailing consensus, contain the text of these common books. Even less well known is that Harlfinger's discovery was anticipated some 50 years before by Walter Ashburner, who had uncovered this fact about Eth. Eud. (...) MSS in the Laurentian library of Florence. Ashburner's anticipation of Harlfinger, however, is not the real value of his article. Its value rather is that it contains collations of readings for the common books, and thereby gives us an excellent resource for examining the text of the common books as this text is contained in exclusively Eth. Eud. MSS. The Eth. Eud. tradition of the common books has hitherto received little attention. Modern editions of Eth. Eud. do not include these books, and editions of Eth. Nic. have other MSS for the purpose. Ashburner's collations are the more valuable because they are taken from the one MS that, in Harlfinger's learned stemma, appears as the archetype for all the rest. (shrink)

Ve svém článku ‘Je elementární logika totéž co predikátová logika prvního řádu?’ (Pokroky matematiky, fyziky a astronomie 42, 1997, 127-133) klade Jiří Fiala nesmírně zajímavou otázku, zda je opodstatněné ztotožňovat elementární logiku s predikátovou logikou prvního řádu; s pomocí argumentů propagovaných již delší dobu finským logikem a filosofem Jaako Hintikkou (viz již jeho Logic, Language-Games and Information, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973; nejnověji jeho The Principles of Mathematics Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996) naznačuje, že by tomu tak být nemuselo. Myslím, (...) že uváděná argumentace stojí za bližší rozbor. Hintikka v podstatě říká: Kvantifikované formule predikátové logiky jsou svou podstatou o vybírání prvků z univerza; například ∀x∃yR(x,y) neříká nic jiného než to, že ke každému x můžeme vybrat y, které je k němu ve vztahu R. Obecněji říká Hintikka to, že každá formule je vlastně zápisem určité hry (ve smyslu matematické teorie her), jejíž některé tahy spočívají ve vybírání individuí. Na základě tohoto se pak ptá: je nějaký rozumný důvod, proč se omezovat jenom na hry toho typu, které jsou vyjádřitelné formulemi standardního predikátového počtu? Proč připouštět jen hry s úplnou informací (tj. ty, při kterých jsou při každém tahu k dispozici všechny tahy předchozí), proč vylučovat hry jiné; tudíž proč připouštět jen lineárně uspořádané kvantifikátory, a nepřipustit i kvantifikátory uspořádané třeba jen částečně? Hintikkova argumentace je příkladem argumentace typu formule logiky prvního řádu jsou ve skutečnosti o tom a o tom, tudíž ... . Uveďme pro ilustraci jiný nedávný příklad stejného argumentačního schématu, který pochází od Johana van Benthema (Exploring Logical Dynamics, CSLI, Stanford, 1997). Ten říká: Kvantifikátory jsou v podstatě modality, kvantifikované formule jsou tedy formule modální a jsou tudíž o existenci nějakých alternativ: formule ∀xP(x) říká, že P(x) je nutné, neboli že P(x) platí v každém „dosažitelném možném stavu věcí“, zatímco formule ∃xP(x) říká, že P(x) je možné, neboli že platí alespoň v jednom takovém stavu věcí.. (shrink)

The phrase ei mihi is used fifteen times by Plautus. On all but one occasion these words introduce a new speaker. The single ‘exception’ is, I suggest, rather an error of transmission. I quote the line in context, Bac. 1171–4 NIC. Ni abeas, quamquam tu bella es, malum tibi magnum dabo iam. BACCH. Patiar, non metuo, ne quid mihi doleat quod ferias. NIC. Ut blandiloquast! ei mihi, metuo. SOR. Hie magis tranquillust. 1173 non – blandiloquast uno versu B 1174 SOROR (...) B: B D. (shrink)

Autor v tomto článku rozporuje pojem non-agrese Murrayho N. Rothbarda a využívá při tom to, co nazývá paradoxem non-agresivní vraždy. Autorovou ambicí není nic menšího než rozbít základy Rothbardovy politické filosofie a využívá přitom důkaz sporem, tedy fakt, že vyvrácení kontradiktorního opaku jako nepravdivého je za podmínek úplné disjunkce zároveň důkazem pravdivosti dokazované teze. Dokazovanou tezí je zde teze: v určitých případech existují pozitivní práva a povinnosti, tedy práva a povinnosti nevyplývající ani ze smlouvy, ani z předešlé agrese. O této (...) skupině práv a povinností však Rothbard říká, že ve skutečnosti neexistuje. Důvodem dle Rothbarda je, že takováto pozitivní práva a povinnosti by porušovaly sebevlastnictví povinovaného, resp. jeho právo k vlastní osobě a majetku. Autor tohoto článku naopak jejich existenci dokazuje poukazem na nepravdivost kontradiktorního opaku („pozitivní práva nikdy neexistují“), kterou ukazuje na uvedených paradoxech obklíčitele, majitele člunu, hostitele a skokana. Určité konkrétní majetkové právo nemůže mít subjekt A i subjekt B současně a ve stejném rozsahu. Zatímco však Rothbard tvrdí, že majetkové právo může vyplývat pouze ze smlouvy či z předchozí agrese (jako právo na kompenzaci), autor tohoto článku argumentuje, že majetkové právo nemusí vyplývat pouze ze smlouvy či z předchozí agrese, a dokazuje to existencí případů, kdy popření mimo-smluvního majetkového práva implikuje paradox non-agresivní vraždy: subjekt, který naplánuje úkladnou vraždu, se nedopouští protiprávní agrese. Což je rozpor. Ergo, teze „pozitivní práva nikdy neexistují“ je nepravdivá. Ergo, pravdivá je autorem dokazovaná teze. Mimo-smluvní práva a povinnosti se tedy nachází v obsahu správně pojatého pojmu sebevlastnictví a úkladná vražda se nikdy nenachází v rozsahu správně pojatého pojmu non-agrese. (shrink)

Artykuł ten wykorzystuje okazję, jaką jest bezprecedensowe wydanie w Polsce Nowej Justyny – jednego z najbardziej niesławnych i skandalicznych dzieł Markiza de Sade (Kraków: Eperons, 2022, przeł. Krzysztof Matuszewski, tom 1-6) – aby zarysować szczególną historię towarzyszącą publikacji tego dzieła, a także by przypomnieć ewentualnym czytelnikom o jego znaczeniu literackim i filozoficznym w opozycji do popularnych aczkolwiek trywialnych twierdzeń, że twórczość Sade’a to nic więcej jak pornografia. Konsekwentny rozwój myśli sadycznej ukazuje filozoficzną odyseję ludzkiego poszukiwania suwerenności. Ma ona swój początek (...) w oświeceniowej negacji Boga, lecz nie zatrzymuje się na niej. W pełni zautonomizowany rozum wchodzi w sojusz z Naturą, lecz jego również musi zakwestionować, tak jak musi zanegować Innego oraz samo Ego, by ostatecznie osiągnąć stanowisko nihilistycznego immoralizmu przejawiającego się apatycznym ponawianiem zbrodni. (shrink)

According to True Detective's creator, Nic Pizzolatto, season two aimed at tragedy, taking inspiration from the archetypical tragedy Oedipus Rex to focus on characters confronting a knowledge that has ultimately fated their path. But, where Aristotle identified the necessity of including "incidents arousing pity and fear" to bring about tragedy's famous katharsis, season two speaks more to Friedrich Nietzsche's views on tragedy—specifically, his views of the ancient Greek dramatist Euripides. Where tragedy once focused on only the "grand and bold traits" (...) of the human condition, Nietzsche says, Euripides focused on the moral concerns of the masses. Against season two's backdrop of civic corruption—land‐grabs and pork‐barrels—the tragedy takes up a modern form of morality for the masses that creates a barrier to tragic wisdom: namely, feminist morality. Rust's philosophical outlook establishes the Apollonian function of tragedy by providing a filter through which to confront the "difficulties of the human condition" expressed in the mysteries of Carcosa. (shrink)

While the notion of the common good figures frequently in both rhetoric and the inquiries of academic political theory, it is often neither closely examined nor precisely defined. This article examines Aristotle’s use of the idea, focusing primarily on two sets of key texts: first, Politics 1.1–2 and Nicomachean Ethics 1.2; and second, Nic. Ethics 8.9 and Politics 3.7. The first set of texts emphasizes the common good as flourishing and the city as its necessary condition; the second emphasizes the (...) common good as the good of all citizens as distinct from that of the rulers alone and leads to Aristotle’s notion of the generic political regime with its focus on the middle class and the rule of law. The conclusion notes both continuities and discontinuities with and challenges to contemporary politics posed by Aristotle’s view, which is neither as readily supportive of modern political programs nor as opposed to modern practices as is sometimes thought. (shrink)

La classificazione delle scienze di Pietro d'Abano costituisce un'interessante riformulazione della classificazione analoga, proposta da Aristotele in Metaph. VI, e della teoria degli abiti dianoetici, proposta da Aristotele in Eth. Nic. VI. Come risulta dal Conciliator per quanto concerne la medicina e dal Lucidator per quanto concerne l'astronomia, Pietro segue la classificazione aristotelica e le interpretazioni che di essa erano state date nel medioevo , aggiungendovi come contributo originale l'introduzione di una parte pratica sia nella medicina che nell'astronomia , dove (...) quest'ultima deriva da Tolomeo e dagli Arabi. Peter of Abano's classification of the sciences is an interesting reformulation of the analogous classification proposed by Aristotle in Metaphysics VI, and of Aristotle's theory of the dianoetic habits found in Nichomachean Ethics VI. As apparent in the Conciliator for medicine and in the Lucidator for astronomy, Peter follows the Aristotelian classification and the interpretations of it given in Middle Ages , adding as his own original contribution the introduction of a practical part on medicine and on astronomy , the latter derived from Ptolemy and the Arabs. (shrink)

Artykuł ma charakter polemiczny – wyraża wątpliwość wobec potocznego przekonania, że materialne pozostałości po społeczeństwach minionych, skoro są jedynym o nich źródłem informacji, mówią „same za siebie”. Przekonanie to znajduje wsparcie w upowszechniającym się ostatnio w humanistyce światowej i europejskiej ukierunkowaniu badań nad kulturą materialną. Istotą owego ukierunkowania - jak twierdzą jego zwolennicy posługujący się hasłem „powrotu do materialności” lub „powrotu do rzeczy” - jest osłabienie czy wręcz wyeliminowanie nieuzasadnionej asymetrii między ludzkimi działaniami intencjonalnymi a nie-ludzkim, materialnym światem relacji przyczynowych. (...) Jednakże odczytywanie pradziejów z uporządkowanych przez archeologa materialnych wytworów jest ich odczytywaniem w języku wspólnotowym, a więc takim, w którym nadana została owemu zbiorowi wytworów treść dziejowa. Treść dziejowa uporządkowanego na muzealnej wystawie zbioru wytworów to rezultat uzgodnień wspólnotowych, literalne odniesienie przedmiotowe, „widziany społecznie” fragment rzeczywistości minionej, jej ujęcie z punktu widzenia akceptowanego kulturowo wcześniejszego zespołu stwierdzeń. Bez uzgodnień w języku wspólnotowym nie jest możliwe nadanie treści dziejowej porządkującej materialne wytwory, tak jak nie jest możliwe jej odczytanie bez znajomości języka wspólnotowego. Beduini czy australijscy aborygeni - przykładowo - nie uczestniczą w „umeblowaniu” świata kultury zachodniej, a więc bez znajomości jego języka wspólnotowego nie są w stanie odczytać treści dziejowej ze zbioru wytworów przedstawiającego ową treść. Język wspólnotowy ma charakter przedustawny; w sensie logicznym wyprzedza zarówno nadawanie materialnym wytworom treści dziejowej, jak i jej odczytanie przez odbiorcę. Materialne przedmioty, podobnie jak i miniona rzeczywistość, w której funkcjonowały, łączą się nierozerwalnie z kontekstem myślowym badacza, z jego kontekstem kulturowym. W związku z tym oddzielenie ich obiektywnego charakteru od kontekstu kulturowego, za pośrednictwem którego są one postrzegane, okazuje się niemożliwe. Nie jest więc możliwe oddzielenie rzeczy od naszego sposobu myślenia o nich. Przedmioty materialne w sensie przyrodoznawczym same w sobie nic nam nie mówią. „Tylko my to robimy” - by użyć sformułowania R. Rorty’ego. Główna teza artykułu ugruntowana jest więc w dokonaniach takich myślicieli jak: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Jerzy Kmita, Hilary Putnam czy Willard Van Orman Quine. Upowszechniające się dziś urzeczowienie badań nad kulturą jest wyrazem mityzacji sposobu myślenia najbardziej czytelnego w kulturze popularnej, a polegającego z jednej strony na antropomorfizowaniu świata natury, z drugiej zaś na równoczesnej reifikacji kulturowego obrazu świata. (shrink)

Večina slikovnih koncepcij boleha za tem, da začenjajo previsoko, namreč na ravni slikovnih del in slikovnih medijev. Zaradi tega pri doživljanju slike nismo pozorni na razpoke in brezna. Ta očitek zadeva tako filozofske teorije slike kot tudi umetnostno teorijo, umetnostno zgodovino in muzejsko prakso, ki se ne zna več čuditi temu, da obstaja nekaj takega kot slike. Naslednji razmisleki se vrtijo okoli geneze slike, ki omogoča vdor v zaprtost nekega v lepi ali nič več lepi videz ujetega estetskega sveta, tako (...) da se sprostijo tako pred- kot tudi post-estetski motivi umetnosti. Umetnost terja genealogijo, ki bo enakovredna Nietzschejevi genealogiji morale ali Husserlovi genealogiji logike.The majority of pictorial conceptions are troubled by starting from too high a level, namely from the level of fine-art works and fine-art media. This is why we are likely to fail to notice crevices and chasms. This reproach is directed both at philosophical theories of the painting and at art theory, art history and museum practice, which is no longer able to express wonder at the sheer existence of the painting. The following reflections tackle the issue of the genesis of the painting, which enables us to penetrate into the closed sphere of the aesthetic world as caught in the beautiful, or no longer beautiful, appearance, and thereby sets free pre- as well as post-aesthetical motives of art. Art demands a genealogy on an equal stand with Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality or Husserl’s genealogy of logic. (shrink)